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Abstract—Actors within an organization usually do not 
behave as expected at design-time. There are diverse reasons 
for this, notably the actors’ motivation and organizational 
commitment. In this paper, we explore the efficiency of a 
concrete public organization in the context of the Latin-
American culture, to the light of the organizational commitment 
of its members. In order to evaluate how much each member of 
the organization is committed, we associate to each one a 
parameter that quantifies its commitment and we evaluate by 
simulation the impact of this parameter on its behavior an the 
organization performance. With a model of the organization as 
it was intended to operate at its foundation, we proceed to a 
number of simulations to find the parameter values that yield 
the actual observed working of the organization. By the way, 
we found that withdrawn behaviors have much more impact 
than committed ones. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let us define an organizational setting, or an organization, 
as a set of goals to be achieved, or more generally some 
purpose, a set of members who contribute to their 
achievement, a set of resources (material or cognitive such 
as information, procedural knowledge, expectations, etc.), 
and a set of rules about the handling of resources by the 
members intended to enable the goals achievement, all these 
elements being more or less precisely defined and 
recognized depending on the nature of the organization.  
The organization's rules are intended to shape and so to 
regulate the participants' behaviors in order to ensure, or at 
least to allow the achievement of the organization's goals. 
However, in most organizational settings, the participants do 
not behave as they are expected to do. This fact may be due 
to the quality of the rules, which are more or less easy to 
apply and demanding for participants, and also are more or 
less effective for the achievement of the organization's goals.  
But rules are abstract in nature so that the participants 
need to interpret them in every concrete situation where their 
application might be considered. Anyway, in many 
particular cases, the letter of a rule can't be applied and it 
must be adapted to the specificity of the current case while 
keeping the spirit of the rule as much as possible. Moreover, 
a strict interpretation of rules does not suffice to ensure the 
proper operating of an organization and, insofar participants 
are interested in its success, they do collaborate and they 
work to rule only in exceptional circumstances. 
In his interpretation of rules, each participant considers 
the organization's goals but also his own individual goals. 
Indeed, the membership of a participant to an organization is 
never completely motivated by the achievement of 
organization's goals and any member expects to obtain some 
individual rewards from his participation. Whatever the 
applicability of the rules of an organization, the behavior of 
each participant is driven by a mix of his own goals with the 
organization's goals, and this causes some deviation between 
his actual behavior and the intended implementation of the 
rules. 
Let us call the aim of a participant the mix of his own 
goals and, according to its role(s) in the organization, the 
goals of the organization that drives his behavior with regard 
to other participants and the whole organization. The relative 
weight of these two components is mainly determined by his 
in-group identification that characterizes the strength of his 
membership to the organization and includes both a 
motivational component (his attachment to group goals) and 
a cognitive component (sharing of the group culture) 
(Simon, 1998). There are several models of this concept, see 
for instance (Kelly, 1993), (Tropp &Wright, 2001), 
(Cameron, 2004). According to (Leach et al., 2008), the in-
group identification of an individual may be assessed by his 
self-definition – the self-stereotyping as being similar to 
others and the group homogeneity – and his self-investment 
– the satisfaction of being a member, the solidarity with 
others and the subjective importance of membership. 
The in-group identification of a participant is a 
psychological trait tightly related to his organizational 
commitment attitude (Kanter 1968). This concept is the 
matter of a wide literature in management studies since the 
organizational commitment of employees is an essential 
factor of the proper working of firms and any organization, 
see for instances (Meyer & Allen, 1991), (Soligen et al. 
2008) and (Subhashini et al. 20014). It determines 
behavioral attitudes such as lateness, absenteeism, turnover 
or organizational citizenship behavior to defend the group 
against threats. Notably, the organizational commitment 
determines the participant's willingness to make efforts to 
support the organization to achieve its objectives and so his 
propensity to collaborate with others. On the opposite, a 
withdrawal behavior gives rise to a weak, or even negative 
involvement in the running of the organization; it may come 
from job dissatisfaction, retaliation against unfairness, job 
stress, lack of empowerment or a strong identification in 
another organization (Beehr et al. 1978). 
SocLab is a theoretical framework for the study of 
cooperation between the actors within an organization, based 
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on power relationships (Sibertin-Blanc et al., 2013a). It is 
implemented in a platform that allows (1) to describe the 
structure of an organization as an instance of a generic meta-
model; (2) to study structural properties of the model of the 
organization in an analytical way and to explore the space of 
its possible configurations (and so to discover Pareto optima, 
Nash equilibria, structural conflicts and so on); (3) to 
compute by simulation how it is plausible that each actor 
behaves with regard to others within this organizational 
context. The SocLab simulation algorithm makes each actors 
to adopt the behavior that provides him with the means to 
achieve his goals, so that in most organizational settings, 
actors reciprocally cooperate with one another (Sibertin-
Blanc et al., 2013b). This algorithm does not cope with the 
relative organizational commitment or withdrawal of the 
actors, so that it falls short for the modeling of 
organizational settings where this factor plays a significant 
role. 
Considering the importance of the actors' involvement for 
the performance of some organizations, the aim of the paper 
is to show how to deal with the actors' commitment in order 
to enhance the SocLab simulation algorithm, and to illustrate 
the application of this new model of actors' behaviors to a 
concrete organization. The paper is organized as follows. 
We first give an overview of the SocLab modeling 
framework and how, according to the current simulation 
algorithm, every actor selects his behavior with regard to 
others. In the third section, we will present the case of a real 
organization which functioning cannot be understand 
without considering the organizational commitment and the 
withdrawal of the actors. In the forth section, we present 
how to assess the withdrawal or commitment of each actor. 
Section five presents the SocLab model of the case while 
section six supplies and analyzes the outcomes of the 
simulation experiments before to conclude.
II.THE SOCLAB FRAMEWORK
To enable the modelling of social relationships between 
the actors of an organization, SocLab proposes a meta-model 
of organizations that catches the common concepts and 
properties of social organizations. This meta-model is 
grounded upon the Sociology of Organised Action (Crozier 
and Friedberg, 1980) and it is intended to be instantiated on 
specific cases as models of concrete or virtual organizations. 
Accordingly, the model of the structure of an organization is 
composed of instances of Actors and Relations that are 
linked by the Control and Depend associations. 
Fig. 1 shows the meta-model of organizations' structures 
as a UML class diagram. A relation is founded on an 
organization’s resource, or a set of resources to be jointly 
used, and it is controlled by a single actor. Resources are 
material or cognitive (factual, procedural or principled 
believes or expectations) elements required to achieve some 
wished actions, so that their availability is necessary for 
some actors. The state attribute of a relation represents the 
behavior of the controller actor with regard to the 
availability of the resource for the ones who need it. Its 
range of value SB (Space of Behavior) goes from the least 
cooperative behavior, -1, of the controller preventing the 
access to the resource, to the most cooperative behaviors, 1, 
favoring this access, while the zero value stands for neutral 
behaviors.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The core of the SocLab meta-model of the structure of 
organizations 
The stake attribute of the dependence of an actor on a 
relation corresponds to the actor's need of the relation, that is 
the usefulness of the underlying resources for the 
achievement of its goals and the relative importance of these 
goals. Stakes are defined on a scale: 
null = 0, negligible = 1,… , significant = 5,… , critical = 10. 
The effect function evaluates how much the state of the 
relation makes the resource available to the actor and so 
provides him with an amount of capability to reach his 
goals. A function effectr : A x SBr ---> [-10, 10] has values 
in: 
worst access = -10, ..., neutral = 0, ..., optimal access =10. 
The shape of an effect function is designed according to 
the potential contribution of the resources underpinning the 
relation to the actor goals. 
In addition, actors may have solidarities the ones with 
regard to others, defined by as a function solidarity(a, b) ---
> [-1, 1], where negative values correspond to hostilities 
and positive values to effective friendships. 
Defining the state, or configuration, of an organization as 
the vector of all relation states, each state s = (sr1, …, srn) 
determines on the one hand how much each actor has the 
means he needs to achieve his goals, defined as: 
 satisfaction(a, s) = ∑c ∈ A ∑r ∈ R solidarity(a, c) * 
              stake(c, r) * effectr(c, sr) 
and, on the other hand how much it contributes to the 
satisfactions of each other actor: 
influence(a, b, s) = ∑r∈ R; a controls r ∑c ∈ A solidarity(b, c) * 
         stake(c, r) * effectr(c, sr) 
and influence(a, s) = ∑b ∈ A influence(a, b, s). 
The aggregation of the actors' satisfaction determines how 
much they have the means to achieve their goals. As these 
goals include the goals of the organization, it determines 
how well the organization operates. The simplest way to 
aggregate the satisfactions is obviously to sum them, and we 
do so in the study of the case, but any other operator may be 
used according to the specificity of the case under 
consideration.  
  
 
This interaction context defines a social actor game, 
where each actor seeks, as a meta-objective, to obtain from 
others enough satisfaction to reach its goals and, to this end, 
adjusts the state of the relations he controls. At each step of 
the game, every actor has the possibility to move the values 
of the states of the relations he controls, and this change of 
the game’s state modifies the satisfaction of actors who 
depend on these relations. Let (sr1, … , srm) be a state of the 
organization and (cr1, …, crm) be moves such that (cr + sr) ∈
SBr and cr is chosen by the actor who controls r. Once each 
actor has chosen such an action, the game goes to a new 
state defined as 
Transition: [ -10; 10] m × [ -10; 10] m → [ -10; 10] m 
       (sr1, … , srm), (cr1, … , crm) a (sr1+cr1, …, srm+crm)  
Unlike games considered in economics, the end of a social 
game is to reach a stationary state: there, actors do no longer 
change the state of the relations they control, because every 
one agrees with the level of satisfaction provided to him by 
the current state of the game. A regularized configuration 
has been reached and the organization can lasting operate in 
this way. 
The simulation module of SocLab makes the actors to 
jointly play the social game. We just give an overview of the 
principles, the simulation algorithm is detailed in (Sibertin-
Blanc et al, 2013b). The actors are assumed to follow a 
bounded rationality (Simon 1982) that is implemented as a 
self-learning process of trial and error based on a system of 
rules of the kind (situation, action, quality). Each actor 
manages a variable that corresponds to his ambition, and the 
game reaches a stationary terminal state when every actor 
gets a satisfaction that exceeds his ambition. The length of 
simulations is a good measure of the difficulty of actors to 
find how to cooperate and in some cases they do not succeed 
(for instance in a circular organization where a depends on b, 
which depends on c, which in turn …). This ambition is 
initiated at the highest possible value of the satisfaction for 
that actor and it progressively comes closer to its current 
level of satisfaction, according to a reality principle. Each 
actor also manages a dynamic rate between exploration and 
exploitation that determines the strength of its search for a 
higher level of satisfaction. An essential property of this 
algorithm is to assume that actors have no information about 
the structure of the game, very few about its current state 
and bring into play limited cognitive capabilities, see 
(Sibertin-Blanc et al, 2013b) for details.  
To sum up, each simulation run yields a regularized 
configuration characterized by the state of each relation, i.e. 
the level of cooperation of the actor who controls this 
relation, and the resulting levels of satisfaction and influence 
for each actor. 
III. THE MODELLED CASE: A TEAM IN A LATIN-AMERICAN 
PUBLIC FOUNDATION  
The study of a concrete organization is introduced to 
illustrate how taking into account of group identification can 
help in auditing organizations or designing policies likely to 
promote collaboration. TDPM is a team inside a Public 
Foundation that is an agency of the Ministry for Science and 
Technology of a Latin-American country. This Public 
Foundation (or the Foundation) is entrusted with the 
investigation, development and spreading of socially 
pertinent free technologies and conducts various projects. 
TDPM (Team for Designing a Planning Methodology) is in 
charge of designing a methodology for Institutional Planning 
in the Public Sector and its functioning evidences in-group 
identification issues. 
A. The origin of the agency: The historical/cultural 
context of the organization 
The motivation for the design and creation of the 
Foundation was the lack of pertinence of technology, due to 
certain cultural problems. Consequently, to understand why 
this Foundation (of which the TDPM is part) has been 
instituted, and which is its aim, a short description of his 
historical/cultural context is necessary (following 
(Fuenmayor, 2006)).  
A culture is in a good state if people looks for and 
cultivates/cares common good, and if it is auto-generative. 
On the other hand, a culture is ill if it is not autonomous, for 
instance, when it is highly imitative and oriented by external 
influence, actors and interests, creating some processes of 
change that disturbs its auto-generative capacities. 
Until the first decades of 1900, the Latin-American 
culture was in a good state. It was mainly of a rural character 
and auto-generative. Common good (including the culture) 
was cultivated. After these decades, a high percentage of 
people from the country side moved to the cities (the rate: 
“people in the cities / people in country side” changed from 
20/80 to 80/20 in many countries). Along this, imitation of 
other cultures promoted by, for instance, communication 
media like radio, TV, CINEMA, etc., increased the demand 
for material instruments, things, and technology that were 
poorly pertinent for the Latin-American society. Over time, 
also the quality of education and caring of common good in 
general decreased. Finally, the culture became ill (at 
different degrees, in almost all countries) in the sense 
described above as it lost its auto-generative capacity. As a 
result, socially negative attitudes appear in organizations, 
e.g., workers distract their effort towards activities different 
from their duties, creating an institutional problem in the 
public sector. 
B. The Foundation: activities and work process 
In one of the Latin-American countries facing the 
strongest cultural difficulties, a group of researchers and 
public servants have promoted the creation of the 
Foundation (of which the TDPM is part), aiming at dealing 
with and changing this cultural and institutional situation. 
The aim of the Foundation is to create free pertinent 
technologies. In this sense, there should be promoted: i) a 
critical/reflexive attitude (reflective/Critical Action), in order 
to be able to discern about pertinent/appropriate 
technologies; and, ii) spreading of the products in the 
  
 
society, in order to increase their impact. The Foundation is 
then designed as having four departmental units for its basic 
activities, supervised by a Management Unit. The basic units 
are: 
• Pertinence Unit: advises other units about the relevance of 
technologies. Its main concern is to reflect on the nature 
of the society, its problems and needs. 
• Research Unit: designs free-technology methodologies, 
organizational patterns and tools.  
• Development Unit: produces the tools for the 
methodologies.  
• Technological Spreading Unit: spreads the use of the 
methodologies and tools in the society. 
The Foundation is involved in projects of software, 
hardware and telecommunications, including organizational 
forms, in collaboration with other public institutions and 
enterprises. TDPM is a team gathering Foundation's 
employees in charge of one of these projects: developing a 
planning methodology. The work process of TDPM follows 
the path shown in Fig. 2. The meeting/dialogue activity (in 
the middle of Fig. 2) allows to coordinate actions of the 
members of the team and to increase their common 
understanding/view of the project. 
C.  The TDPM 
The analysis of TDPM organization regarding group 
identification issues leads to identify seven actors: two 
actors from the Research Unit, two actors from the 
Development Unit, and one actor from each of the three 
other units. Their work process is schematized in Fig. 2 and 
we summarize the duties of each actor as follows:  
Director: It manages the work of others and allocates the 
means they need. It is also responsible for delivering the 
products of the Foundation to the society and the Ministry 
for Science and Technology. 
• Researcher_C: It designs the planning methodology, and 
specifies the requirements of the tools. It is responsible 
for the quality of the methodology and its effective 
pertinence. 
• Researcher_W: It operatively helps the Researcher_C in 
elaborating detailed requirements of the methodology.  
• Developer_C: It designs and develops software tools for 
the implementation of the methodology and is 
responsible for the quality of the tools. 
• Developer_W: It helps the developer_C actor operatively, 
developing particular functionalities of the software.  
• PertAdviser_C: It investigates the state of the art and is 
responsible for advising the rest of the team, notably the 
researcher about the social pertinence of methodologies. 
• TechSpreader_W: It is responsible for spreading the 
product, i.e., for promoting the use and social impact of 
the methodology. 
D. The members' expected and actual behaviors 
At the time of its creation, the Foundation was design 
assuming workers being highly identified and committed 
with the Foundation and strongly collaborative with their 
partners. The workers are expected to show a critic and 
autonomous attitude, cultivating themselves in this way, in 
order to find out the sense and pertinence of the technology 
in the country. As in any organization, the more the 
collaboration of actors and the coordination of their 
activities, the better the suitability and quality of the 
products provided by the team.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Main interactions within TDPM for developing the planning 
methodology. It completes a loop from identifying requirements of the 
society to spreading the methodology into the society. 
 
However, the Foundation suffers from the above 
mentioned cultural problems and from negative attitudes that 
prevail in the considered country. A common withdrawal 
attitude pays little attention to organizational duties and 
gives preference to personal activities such as the 
membership to a political party or involvement in the 
academic milieu. Fortunately, not all actors have this kind of 
behaviour and there are also actors highly involved with the 
organization. Some actors of TDPM are highly engaged and 
creative, identified with the organization and hardworking, 
while other actors are weakly identified with the 
organization, and thus their work is of poor quality and they 
are little creative. 
In the TDPM, the actors pertAdviser_C, researcher_C and 
developer_C reveal to be highly Committed while the other 
four actors are Withdrawn at different degrees. 
IV.  EVALUATION OF THE COMMITMENT AND WITHDRAWAL 
OF ACTORS 
There are obvious differences in the commitment of the 
actors of TDPM, so the question arises to evaluate their 
respective levels of commitment in order to evaluate the 
magnitude of the management actions that could improve 
the involvement of the withdrawn actors. This evaluation 
can be done using a GI (Group Identification) parameter 
associated to each actor, where GI = 1 corresponds to a fully 
committed actor, GI = -1 corresponds to a fully withdrawn 
actor while GI = 0 corresponds to a neutral attitude which is 
not particularly committed or withdrawn. 
What about the impact of the GI parameter on the actors' 
behavior-selecting process? In the SocLab simulation 
algorithm, actors are mainly utilitarist as they just search to 
obtain a good level of satisfaction, i.e. the capability got 
  
 
from others to reach their own goals by having a good access 
to the resources they need. To account for the commitment 
of an actor, we may assume that it is also interested in 
exerting a high level of influence, i.e. in the capability it 
distributes to others. As for a withdrawn actor who devotes 
its energy to another matter than its job, it searches on the 
contrary to reduce its influence. This leads to consider that 
the behavior-selecting process of an actor will no longer be 
driven by just its satisfaction but by its aim, defined for an 
actor a in a state s = (sr1, …,
 
srn) of the organization as: 
 aim(a, s) = (1 - abs(GI(a)))*satisfaction(a, s) +  
              GI(a)*influence(a, s)  
where the abs() function returns the absolute value of a 
number. A neutral actor will search just for a high 
satisfaction, a committed actor will also search for a high 
influence while a withdrawn actor will also search for a low 
influence. 
In the capabilities exchanged among actors, there is a 
specific amount that appears both in the satisfaction and the 
influence of an actor, that is its auto-satisfaction influence(a, 
a, s). For committed actors, this term is not affected by the 
value of GI, and for withdrawn actors it means that the actor 
searches to disfavor itself. To avoid these inconsistencies, 
we take off the auto-satisfaction of an actor from its 
influence and so define the aim as: 
aim(a, s) = (1-abs(GI(a)))*satisfaction(a, s) +  
       GI(a)*(influence(a, s) - influence(a, a, s)). 
For the modeling of TDPM, we could design a model 
describing the actual observed configuration with a neutral 
GI for all actors, and then search for a distribution of GI that 
makes TDPM to operate properly as wished by its 
promoters. Proceeding in this way would provide the deficit 
of commitment of actors; for instance, for a withdrawn actor, 
we will find a positive GI that indicates how much it should 
increase its (negative) investment for the organization to 
recover a better working. This way would assume that the 
effect of a change in the Group Identification of an actor is 
quite linear and that withdrawal is just the opposite of 
commitment. This is a very strong hypothesis that is not 
always verified in psychological matter, as shown by the 
well-known case of risk-aversion (this is why SocLab use 
bipolar scales for behaviors (i.e. the state of relations) and 
capabilities). 
So we will process in another way. We will model TPDM 
as it was expected to operate by its designers (see A and B 
above) with actors featuring a neutral GI, and then search for 
a distribution of GI whose outcomes correspond to the actual 
observed behavior.  
V. THE SOCLAB MODEL OF TDPM 
We will now apply this approach to the TDPM case study. 
The SocLab model includes the seven actors previously 
introduced and each actor controls a single relation that 
synthesizes its means to influence others. This model has 
been developed in interaction with persons who are or have 
been involved in TDPM, with whom also the simulation 
results have been shared and discussed. A more extensive 
description of TDPM and its model are given in (Terán et 
al., 2013) and indications about the designing of SocLab 
models are given in (Sibertin-Blanc et al. 2013a).  
Table I shows the actors' stakes and Table II the effect 
functions. We cannot discusses these tables in detail and just 
give some comments. The distribution of stakes shows how 
much each actor depends on the behavior of each other for 
the achievement of its goals, assuming that these goals are 
just determined by its role in the organization. Resercher_C 
depends only for 2 points on itself (while others depend on 3 
or 3.5) because it is the responsible for the project. The 
shape of the effect functions is very standard: each one 
benefices of the work done by others and is fully satisfied by 
a moderate effort. 
Table III show the solidarities of each actor toward its 
colleagues that reveal to be reciprocal. It is due to actors 
common interests and activities related with: (i) 
academicism, i.e., accumulation of academic curriculum that 
are beyond the benefice of TDPM and result from a personal 
interest, in the case of actors TechSpreader_W and 
Researcher_W; (ii) politicism, related with their 
participation in a political party that favours the involved 
actors, in the case of the actors Director and PertAdviser_W. 
Due to the solidarity between the Director and PertAdvis_C, 
the former will get a lower satisfaction than the other 
withdrawn actors, and PertAdvis_C a higher one than the 
others committed actors. 
VI. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS 
All the simulations are run 100 times and we just present 
the average values. We first give the simulation results with 
a null GI for all actors, i.e. as intended by the promoters of 
the Foundation. In this case, TDPM operates well and 
simulations are short: actors do not have difficulties to 
cooperate and they do collaborate. Then we calibrate the 
actors' GI parameters to find the values that provide 
simulation results close to the operating of TDPM that is 
actually observed. 
A. The expected operating of TDPM 
Table IV shows the distribution of capability of actors one 
another at the mean configuration resulting from 
simulations; the standard deviations are between 0.3 and 1.4, 
quite small with regard to the range of values (around 190). 
Table V shows the same results in percentage, i.e. as (value 
– min_value) / (max_value – min_value). The differences in 
value do not produce the same differences in percentage 
because the actors do not have the same range of 
capabilities. As the actors of the TDPM model are strongly 
dependent on one another, each one cooperates to the best of 
its possibilities so that results are very close to the ones at 
the "optimal" configuration where each actor gives 100% of 
its influence and the maximum of the total actors' 
satisfaction is reached. However, due to the shape of the 
effect functions, satisfactions at the mean configuration are 
  
 
higher (6 or 7 points) than the mean satisfactions 
(respectively: Director 83.69, Researcher_C 83.03, 
Researcher_W 85.54, Developer_C 83.93, Developer_W 
83.73, PertAdviser_C 83.17, TechSpreader_W 84.35). 
TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTORS' STAKES (IN COLUMN) ON THE RELATION;  
VALUES ON THE DIAGONAL SHOW THE WEIGHT OF AUTO-SATISFACTIONS. 
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researchMeth_C 1.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 
researchMeth_W 1.0 1.5 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.5 
develTools_C 1.0 1.0 0.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
develTools_W 1.0 1.0 0.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 
pertinence 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 3.0 1.5 
techSpread 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 3.5 
 
TABLE II. THE SHAPE OF THE EFFECT FUNCTIONS OF EACH RELATION (IN ROW) ON EACH ACTOR; THE X-AXIS CORRESPONDS TO THE STATE OF THE 
RELATION AND THE Y-AXIS TO THE RESULTING CAPABILITY FOR THE ACTOR. THE TABLE SHOWS ONLY THE FIRST TWO ROWS, THE EFFECTS OF THE 
RELATIONS PROJECTSUPPORT AND RESEARCHMETH_C. THE EFFECT FUNCTIONS OF OTHER RELATIONS ARE SIMILAR REGARDING THE SHAPE OF 
THE FUNCTION FOR THE ACTOR CONTROLLING THE RELATION AND THE SHAPES OF THE FUNCTIONS FOR OTHER ACTORS. 
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TABLE III. THE SOLIDARITY OF ACTORS (IN ROW) TOWARD ITS COLLEAGUES 
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director 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
researcher_C 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
researcher_W 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
developer_C 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
developer_W 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
pertAdviser_C 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
techSpreader_W 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE IV. THE DISTRIBUTION (IN VALUE) OF CAPABILITY OF EACH ACTOR (IN COLUMN) TOWARD OTHERS AT THE MEAN CONFIGURATION 
RESULTING FROM 100 SIMULATION RUNS WHEN GI IS NULL FOR ALL ACTORS. THE LAST ROW SHOWS THE INFLUENCE OF EACH ACTOR AND THE 
LAST COLUMN ITS RESULTING SATISFACTION. THE BOTTOM-RIGHT CELL GIVES THE MEAN SATISFACTION (AND INFLUENCE) OF ACTORS. 
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director 28.6 13.3 8.7 8.6 8.7 12.9 9.6 90.5 
researcher_C 17.9 19.2 13.1 8.6 8.7 13.5 8.8 89.7 
researcher_W 13.4 20.9 31.1 4.7 4.8 9.4 7.3 91.7 
developer_C 8.9 13.3 13.1 29.4 17.4 4.5 4.4 91.0 
developer_W 8.9 13.3 13.1 17.2 29.2 4.5 4.4 90.7 
pertAdviser_C 13.9 13.3 8.7 8.6 8.7 24.7 12.3 90.2 
techSpreader_W 13.4 10.2 7.3 8.2 8.3 13.0 31.0 91.5 
Influence 105.0 103.7 95.1 85.4 85.9 82.5 77.8 90.8 
 
TABLE V.  THE DISTRIBUTION (IN PERCENTAGE) OF CAPABILITY OF EACH ACTOR (IN COLUMNS) TOWARDS OTHERS AT THE MEAN CONFIGURATION 
RESULTING FROM 100 SIMULATION RUNS WHEN GI IS NULL FOR ALL ACTORS. 
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director 98.4 % 96.1 % 95.2 % 94.7 % 95.2 % 100.0 % 95.5 % 97.0 % 
researcher_C 96.4 % 98.0 % 95.2 % 94.7 % 95.2 % 96.6 % 95.5 % 96.2 % 
researcher_W 96.4 % 96.1 % 98.8 % 94.7 % 95.2 % 96.6 % 99.8 % 97.2 % 
developer_C 96.4 % 96.1 % 95.2 % 99.0 % 95.2 % 96.6 % 95.5 % 96.7 % 
developer_W 96.4 % 96.1 % 95.2 % 94.7 % 98.7 % 96.6 % 95.5 % 96.5 % 
pertAdviser_C 100 % 96.1 % 95.2 % 94.7 % 95.2 % 98.3 % 95.5 % 96.9 % 
techSpreader_W 96.4 % 96.1 % 99.7 % 94.7 % 95.2 % 96.6 % 98.7 % 97.1 % 
Influence 99.6 % 98.4 % 99.2 % 98.8 % 99.1 % 99.7 % 99.7 %  
 
B. Variation of the distribution of actors' GI 
Tables VI to IX show simulation results according to the 
decreasing GI of the withdrawn actors (director, 
researcher_W, developer_W and techSpreader_W) and 
increasing GI of the committed actors (researcher_C, 
developer_C and pertAdviser_C).  
Table VI shows that simulations runs are short when GI of 
all actors is null (the top-left cell); the structure of the game 
is simple and the seven actors have no difficulty to find a 
(good) compromise. A glance at each column shows that the 
decrease of the GI of withdrawn actors makes simulation 
runs systematically longer, meaning that it becomes more 
difficult for the actors to find a consensual configuration. On 
the opposite, the increase of committed actors' GI makes 
simulation runs systematically shorter, but with a smaller 
effect: values on the diagonal are increasing. 
Table VII shows that the decrease of the GI of withdrawn 
actors diminishes the global satisfaction of actors more and 
more from 0 to -0.4, whatever the GI of committed actors. 
For the (0, 0) distribution, the 83.81 satisfaction corresponds 
to 95% of the optimal operating of TDPM, while for the (-
0.5, 0) distribution the 10.9 satisfaction corresponds to 57% 
of the optimal operating (the minimum and maximum global 
satisfactions are respectively -96.5 and 92 respectively). 
Except in the absence of withdrawal (the first row), the 
increase of committed actors' GI also decreases the global 
satisfaction, while slightly.  
Table IX shows that withdrawn and committed actors 
have similar satisfactions when all GI are null (the slight 
difference 0.81 comes from the responsibility of the project 
for the Researcher_C committed actor), and that the formers 
take advantage of whatever departure from this situation. 
The higher involvement of committed actors increases the 
gap between the withdrawn and committed actors and this 
explain why it also decreases the global satisfaction seen in 
Table VII: a systematic cooperation of committed actors 
ensures withdrawn actors a high level of satisfaction and by 
the way exempt them to cooperate, so that its impact on the 
whole organization is negative. In average, the increase of 
  
 
commitment from 0 to 0.5 increases the gap by 4.3 while the 
increase of withdrawal from 0 to -0.5 increases the gap by 
5.1.  
To sum up, in all tables the main variations occur between 
rows and not between columns: the effect of withdrawal is 
much more important than the one of commitment. 
Withdrawal and commitment are not at all opposite 
phenomena since, if one except the first and the last rows of 
Table VII, the increase of both decreases the global 
satisfaction (Table VII) and benefits to withdrawn actors 
(Table IX). Moreover these effects are quite independent: all 
rows exhibit the same variation pattern (up to translation) 
and the same holds for columns. The effect of commitment 
(examine each row) is quite linear while the effect of 
withdrawal (seen on each column) is not: e.g. in Table VII, 
the effect is increasingly important from 0 to -0.4, while the 
change from -0.4 to -0.5 requires specific explanations. As 
mentioned at the end of section V, the solidarity between 
Director and PertAdvis_C lessens the effect of GI variation, 
increasingly with the gap between withdrawn and committed 
actors. 
 
TABLE VI. MEAN NUMBER OF STEPS TO REACH A REGULATED 
CONFIGURATION DEPENDING ON THE GI LEVEL OF WITHDRAWN (IN 
ROW) AND COMMITTED (IN COLUMN) ACTORS. 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
0 1673 1082 653 455 388 344 
-0.1 2697 2128 1649 1303 1034 910 
-0.2 4292 4154 3906 3564 3231 3172 
-0.3 6680 6536 6569 6266 5910 5501 
-0.4 9638 9649 9713 9410 8922 8321 
-0.5 11033 11236 11239 11099 10659 9994 
 
TABLE VII.  THE AVERAGE SATISFACTION OF ALL ACTORS DEPENDING 
ON THE GI LEVEL OF WITHDRAWN (IN ROW) AND COMMITTED (IN 
COLUMN) ACTORS. 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 0 83.81 84.41 85.25 85.65 86.13 86.71 
-0.1 83.01 83.09 83.01 83.11 82.92 82.99 
-0.2 77.36 76.44 76.14 76.95 77.88 75.60 
-0.3 60.18 59.93 58.39 59.10 57.45 53.68 
-0.4 32.15 32.55 31.75 31.08 31.30 28.64 
-0.5 10.93 12.20 13.27 13.40 13.25 13.63 
 
TABLE IIX. THE AVERAGE SATISFACTION OF WITHDRAWN ACTORS 
DEPENDING ON THE GI LEVEL OF WITHDRAWN (IN ROW) AND 
COMMITTED (IN COLUMN) ACTORS. 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 0 84.15 85.56 86.79 87.56 88.30 89.16 
-0.1 83.94 84.49 84.94 85.16 85.34 85.68 
-0.2 79.37 79.21 79.18 80.29 81.16 79.27 
-0.3 64.04 64.25 63.21 64.22 63.09 59.43 
-0.4 36.87 37.85 37.50 37.01 37.58 34.89 
-0.5 13.42 15.40 17.12 17.55 17.63 18.38 
 
TABLE IX.  THE GAP BETWEEN THE MEAN SATISFACTIONS OF 
WITHDRAWN AND COMMITTED ACTORS DEPENDING ON THE GI LEVEL 
OF WITHDRAWN (IN ROW) AND COMMITTED (IN COLUMN) ACTORS. 
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 0 0.81 2.69 3.59 4.44 5.05 5.73 
-0.1 2.19 3.27 4.50 4.78 5.66 6.28 
-0.2 4.70 6.47 7.10 7.79 7.64 8.57 
-0.3 9.02 10.08 11.25 11.95 13.16 13.43 
-0.4 11.02 12.37 13.42 13.83 14.66 14.60 
-0.5 5.82 7.47 8.98 9.69 10.21 11.08 
 
The GI distribution -0.3 for withdrawn actors and 0.2 or 
0.3 for committed actors is quite close to the observed 
configuration, even if more precise distributions 
distinguishing the GI among the withdrawn and among the 
committed actors should be considered (see (Terán et al., 
2013)).  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Organizations seldom operate as intended and expected. It 
can be caused by the very structure of the organization that 
render the necessary cooperation among the actors difficult 
to establish, by the presence of structural conflicts that force 
actors either to opposition or to fragile compromises, or by 
lack of fairness or empowerment. The SocLab simulation 
algorithm studies how each actor is likely to cooperate 
within an organization, assuming that it is interested in the 
duration of the organization, and thus its proper functioning, 
and thus cooperates to the extent this is beneficial for him, 
according to the reciprocity principle (Sibertin-Blanc et al. 
2013a; 2013b). The deviation from the intended working of 
an organization can also be caused by the lack or even the 
excess of commitment of actors who do not cooperate in an 
appropriate way with others. 
In this paper, we have shown how to account for the 
withdrawal or the commitment of actors by the introduction 
of a parameter associated to each actor, its Group 
Identification (GI), that indicates to what extent it deviates 
from the standard level of cooperation, in excess or in 
default. Applying this model to a very concrete organization 
that features troubles due to a dysfunctional GI of some of 
its members, we have found values likely to approximate the 
level of GI of actors of the organization. By the way, we 
have found that withdrawal is much more effective than 
commitment. Withdrawal is not just the opposite of 
commitment, since the later does not compensate the former, 
and a change in withdrawal has much more effect than the 
same change in commitment. Surprisingly, it seems that high 
commitment of some actors’ is not always beneficial to an 
organization. 
Even if this quantification of withdrawal is approximate, 
it allows making comparisons between different cases, what 
is the basis of any engineering practice. It is also likely to 
indicate the order of magnitude of actions to be undertaken 
in order to modify the GI of the members of an organization. 
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